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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of Virginia’s policy of exempting hybrid-electric vehi-
cles from minimum occupancy requirements on state HOV lanes. Virginia registra-
tion statistics are used to compile hybrid market shares on a county level to compare 
the impact of HOV lane access to other socioeconomic variables. The HOV incentive 
is shown to have a significant impact in Northern Virginia, but not in the Hampton 
Roads area. The paper also addresses the criticisms and potential unintended conse-
quences of the incentive policy, including whether it has impacted the “green” image 
of the hybrid in Virginia.
Introduction
This article examines the impact of HOV lane exemption policies for hybrid-elec-
tric vehicles, focusing primarily on the state of Virginia. Sales and general interest 
in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) has risen steadily in recent years in response to 
rising fuel costs and increased concern about pollution and greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Hybrid vehicles utilize the same gasoline fuel infrastructure as conventional 
Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles, yet represent a distinct technology 
improvement that can provide greater fuel economy and reduced emissions for 
equivalent vehicle performance by recapturing energy normally lost during break-Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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ing (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). As an energy efficiency technology, HEVs 
also address positive externalities associated with resource management, the 
environment, and energy security, which are not taken into account by the market 
(Jaffe and Stavins 1994). In addition, HEVs face barriers to diffusion that are com-
mon to many new cost-saving technologies, such as high initial unit costs, lack of 
knowledge by potential adopters, high discount rates for future cost savings, and 
low consumer risk tolerance (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Stoneman and Diederen 1994; 
Argote and Epple 1990). To account for these externalities and barriers to adop-
tion, the U.S. Federal Government and many state governments have offered a 
variety of incentives and privileges to consumers who purchase hybrids and alter-
native fuel vehicles (U.S. Department of Energy 2007), one of the most notable 
being an exemptions from minimum vehicle occupancy requirements in High 
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) carpool lanes. This privilege can result in considerable 
time savings for commuters who purchase hybrids.
Where HOV lanes exist and have sufficient excess capacity, allowing hybrids or 
alternative fuel vehicles on HOV lanes with a single occupant provides a means of 
promoting adoption with almost no direct marginal costs to taxpayers, other than 
the cost of publicizing, administering, and enforcing the program. Virginia was the 
first state to adopt this policy, starting in 2000, and since 2005 several other states, 
including Florida, Georgia, Utah, New York, New Jersey, California and Arizona, 
have allowed hybrids on at least some of the state’s HOV lanes (U.S. Department 
of Energy 2007). Due to its seven-year history of allowing hybrids on HOV lanes, 
Virginia provides an excellent case study of the impact of HOV incentive policies 
for hybrids and may provide insights for other jurisdictions considering similar 
policy incentives. To that end, this paper examines the background of Virginia’s 
HOV lane incentive and its impact on local adoption patterns. It compares the 
impact of Virginia’s HOV lane policy to other potential determinants of hybrid 
vehicle adoption, including income, environmentalism, and commuting charac-
teristics. Additionally, it looks at the potential for unintended consequences of the 
policy and whether there is evidence that HOV incentives have led to a backlash 
against the “green” image of hybrids in Virginia.
This paper builds on previous research into the determinants of hybrid vehicle 
adoption. Kahn (2007) found that environmentalism (as indicated by Green Party 
affiliation) was associated with hybrid ownership, based on regression analysis 
of census track-level data in six California cities. Heffner et al. (2005) conducted 
detailed interviews with households in Northern California that own HEVs and 41
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determined that both anticipated cost savings and the “green image” of hybrids 
influence purchase decisions. McManus and Berman (2005) analyzed the results 
of an online survey taken by 532 hybrid owners and 933 potential owners who 
visited the HEV information website HybridCars.com. Their report identified the 
desire to save money on gas and reduce pollution as significant motivating factors 
for purchasing a hybrid among both sets of respondents. A 2004 marketing survey 
by ChangeWave Research concluded that hybrid owners tend to be in the highest 
income demographics and are more sensitive to gas prices than environmental 
benefits in purchasing their vehicles (ChangeWave Research 2005). 
Several more recent studies on hybrid vehicle adoption that also examine the 
impact of government incentives have been conducted using sales and registra-
tion data for U.S. states. Diamond (2008) conducted cross-sectional regressions 
of annual state market share for top-selling hybrid models using RL Polk registra-
tion data. The analysis found that average gasoline prices, income, miles traveled, 
and environmentalism were all positively related to market share, but that the 
presence or values of monetary incentives at the state level was generally weak or 
insignificant compared to these other factors. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) 
analyzed actual sales transaction data provided by JD Power and found a more sig-
nificant impact from state incentives. However, both studies noted that sales tax 
waivers tended to be more significant than income tax credits, and that Virginia’s 
HOV incentive appeared to have significantly impacted market share. This paper 
further contributes to the literature on incentive policies for hybrids by examin-
ing the impact of Virginia’s HOV policy at the local level. It makes use of market 
share calculations for individual Virginia cities and counties to explore how the 
impact of the HOV incentive on hybrid adoption varied among different jurisdic-
tions within the state, taking into account local variations in other factors such as 
income, environmentalism, and commuting habits. 
Virginia HOV System Background
Virginia’s incentive policy stems from a law predating the introduction of hybrids, 
which authorized the HOV lane exemption for a variety of alternative fuel vehicles. 
When hybrids were first introduced in the U.S. in 2000, the state Department 
of Motor Vehicles—under pressure from consumers and lawmakers—allowed 
hybrids (which run on gasoline and are therefore not technically alternative fuel 
vehicles) to also qualify for the program (Morrison and Counts 2005). Access to 
HOV lanes is controlled by issuing hybrids and other alternative fuel vehicles a Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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“special clean fuel” license plate, which can be seen by police enforcing HOV rules. 
These plates provide single-occupant access to HOV lanes in two major areas: 
Northern Virginia, which boarders Washington, DC, and the Hampton Roads 
area, which includes Newport News, Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Virginia Beach. 
The Northern Virginia HOV lanes include three major highways—along Inter-
state Route 66 (I-66), the Dulles Toll Road (VA 267) and Interstate Route 95/395 
(I-95/395).1 The law authorizing the exemption originally contained a two-year 
sunset clause, but until 2006 it was renewed for two additional years each time it 
had been set to expire. In 2006, lawmakers renewed the exemption for only one 
additional year, but ended single-occupant access for hybrids purchased after June 
30, 2006, on the I- 95/395 HOV lanes in response to concerns about overcrowding. 
In 2007 and 2008, the law was extended only on an annual basis; it is currently set 
to expire on June 30, 2009 (Virginia Department of Transportation 2008).
The map in Figure 1 shows the general locations of the Hampton Roads and 
Northern Virginia HOV networks. The map in Figure 2 shows the highways that 
make up the Northern Virginia HOV network. 
On VA 267 and Interstate 66 (outside of I-495), HOV lanes consist of the left-
most highway lane in each direction and are not physically separated from the 
rest of the highway. During the morning rush hours, these lanes are restricted to 
HOV-2 (two or more occupants required) in the inbound direction, switching to 
HOV-2 outbound during the evening rush hour. Along I-66 between I-495 and 
the Washington, DC border, the entire highway is restricted to HOV-2 inbound 
in the morning (with non-HOV traffic permitted outbound only), and HOV-2 
only for all outbound traffic in the afternoon (with non-HOV traffic permitted 
inbound). The most extensive HOV lane network is the 27-mile segment along 
Interstate I-95/395. The I-95/395 HOV lanes consist of a reversible two-lane seg-
ment that is separated from the main highway with limited access points, open 
to inbound (northbound towards Washington, DC) traffic in the morning and 
outbound traffic in the evening. Traffic is restricted to HOV-3 (three or more 
passengers required) during the morning and evening rush hours. Of these three 
HOV systems, the I-95/395 HOV lanes handle the most traffic and offer the most 
significant percentage time savings (approximately 50%) compared to non-HOV 
traffic (Morrison and Counts 2005). Hampton Roads has HOV lanes on several of 
the main highways, but time savings and traffic volume on the HOV network are 
much lower than in Northern Virginia (The Marketing Source 2002).43
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Figure 1. Virginia HOV lanes
Figure 2. Northern Virginia HOV Lanes
Criticism and Unintended Consequences
Since its inception, Virginia’s HOV exemption rule for hybrids has been the subject 
of considerable debate. Originally, the practice was in violation of Federal highway 
regulations for HOV lanes on interstate highways, which mandated that HOV 
lanes were only for high occupancy vehicles (Federal Highway Adminsitration 
2005). This debate was ended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which authorized 
states to allow HOV exemptions for hybrids and other clean fuel vehicles. How-
ever, critics in newspaper editorials, opinion pieces, and internet discussion boards 
point out that the incentive policy runs counter to other policies designed to Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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promote energy efficient practices such as carpooling and the use of mass transit 
(Ginsberg 2006). Some of the most vehement criticism of hybrid HOV drivers 
is found on discussion boards devoted to carpooling and ridesharing. One such 
message board, Slug-Line.com, contains over 2,800 mostly negative postings in 88 
separate threads devoted to hybrids in the HOV lanes, with topics such as “hybrid 
hate,” “anti-hybrid road rage,” and “tired of choking on hybrid fumes.”2 
One common complaint by critics is that single-occupant hybrid commuters in 
HOV lanes actually consume more gasoline per mile, on average, than carpool-
ers in less efficient vehicles with two or three passengers (Kuehnel 2006). By this 
criterion, hybrids would have to achieve a fuel economy of over 60 mpg to justify 
access to the HOV lanes that normally require two vehicle occupants, based on 
an average fuel economy of 29.5 mpg for passenger automobiles in 2006 (National 
Highway Transit Safety Administration 2006). This comparison may be partially 
valid, but the broader environmental impact of the policy is more difficult to 
determine and depends both on the percentage of hybrid drivers who would have 
commuted alone in the non-HOV lanes otherwise and the extent to which solo 
hybrid commuters also use their hybrids for non-commuting trips on evenings 
and weekends in place of less fuel efficient vehicles. Virginia has not conducted 
sufficient survey research to determine whether hybrid ownership has directly 
impacted carpooling or mass transit ridership in Virginia. However, a 2005 Virginia 
Department of Transportation Study concluded that hybrids accounted for 19 
percent of traffic on the I-95 HOV corridor during the morning rush hour, and 
that this additional traffic had pushed the HOV lanes beyond their design capacity 
(Morrison and Counts 2005). It is likely that such increased congestion in the HOV 
lanes would serve as a disincentive to carpooling. 
There is also an equity issue, since the HOV exemption policy favors those who 
not only can afford to buy a new car but can also pay the incremental premium to 
purchase a hybrid model over an equivalent gasoline-only model. While the avail-
ability of more affordable used hybrids should increase over time, Virginia Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records in May 2007 indicated that used vehicles 
still accounted for less than 15 percent of the total number of hybrids titled.
The combination of HOV lane overcrowding and backlash by carpoolers could 
potentially promote a more negative image of hybrid owners in Virginia, as com-
pared to a generally positive image of hybrid owners in other parts of the country 
as environmentally-conscious consumers. To the extent that this phenomenon 
occurs, it may serve as a disincentive to consumers in the Northern Virginia area 45
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who do not desire HOV lane access but might otherwise have considered a hybrid 
for the positive environmental or “green” image it connotes. 
The remainder of this paper addresses several basic research questions that arise 
from Virginia’s experience with its HOV lane incentive. First, it explores whether 
the HOV incentive has been effective in promoting adoption of hybrids in North-
ern Virginia and Hampton Roads and how the effect of the policy compares to 
other socioeconomic factors. Second, it explores whether there is evidence that 
the policy has tarnished the “green” image of the hybrid in Virginia.
Geographical Analysis of Virginia Adoption Patterns
Statistics on new hybrid market share (new hybrids as a percentage of all new 
vehicles registered) for all Virginia counties and independent cities were used to 
test the impact of HOV lane policies in promoting adoption compared to other 
factors. The Virginia DMV provided basic data on every hybrid registered in the 
state as of May 31, 2007, including the automobile make, model, model year, origi-
nal title date, and garaged jurisdiction (county or independent city).3 Using this 
database, the numbers of new and used hybrid vehicles titled in each county and 
independent city were calculated each year for Virginia Fiscal Years4 2001 through 
2006 (FY01-06) and for the first three quarters of FY07. The DMV also provided a 
separate data set with the total number of new and used vehicles titled each fiscal 
year for each jurisdiction, which allowed the calculation of market share. The deci-
sion to analyze market share by fiscal year was driven primarily by the way that the 
DMV provided the data on total numbers of vehicles titled for each jurisdiction. 
However, the use of fiscal year was also convenient because it corresponded nicely 
with the change in the HOV policy for I-95/395 starting on July 1, 2006.
Figures 3 and 4 show the relative market share (given as a percentage) of new 
hybrids among counties in Northern Virginia and in the entire state, respectively, 
from FY01-06.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the dramatic difference in market share between counties 
adjacent to the Northern Virginia HOV lanes from those in the rest of the state. 
Stafford County, which includes the southern terminus of the I-95 HOV lanes, had 
the highest market share in the state for each individual year and for the combined 
period from FY01 through FY06. In FY06 (the year before the I-95/395 exemption 
ended), almost 6 percent of all new car registrations for Stafford County were for 
hybrid vehicles. Presumably, the high hybrid market shares in Northern Virginia Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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Figure 3. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Percentages 
in Northern Virginia, FY01-06
Figure 4. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Percentages 
in Virginia Counties, FY01-0647
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are directly related to the time-savings value of the HOV exemption for com-
muters in these counties. The impressive market share in the Northern Virginia 
HOV corridors is in sharp contrast to lackluster market share in the remainder of 
the state. Despite the apparent impact of the HOV incentive policy in Northern 
Virginia, there is little graphical evidence that the policy impacted market share in 
the Hampton Roads area. This apparent discrepancy will be discussed further in 
the following sections. 
It is important to note that the market share is based on new hybrids as a percent-
age of new vehicles, so this comparison already takes into account the fact that 
consumers in more affluent counties or cities are more likely to purchase new cars 
(versus used cars) than in less affluent jurisdictions. Figure 5 shows a geographical 
representation of market share percentages after correcting for income (dividing 
the market share by median county income), illustrating that the high market 
share for hybrids along the I-95/395 and I-66 HOV corridors is not strictly a func-
tion of higher consumer income in Northern Virginia.
Figure 5. Hybrid (HEV) Market Share Normalized by Income, FY01-06
Another indication of the impact of the I-95/395 HOV exemption is the change in 
hybrid sales patterns in Northern Virginia after the exemption ended for hybrids 
purchased after June 30, 2006. Market share for the first nine months of FY07 
dropped dramatically in Stafford and Prince William counties compared to FY06. 
The relative ratios of FY07 to FY06 sales in Virginia counties and cities are shown 
in Figure 6.Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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Figure 6. Ratios of FY07 to FY06 Hybrid (HEV) Sales
Regression Analysis of Virginia Cities and Counties
The significance of the HOV lane incentive compared to other socioeconomic deter-
minants was explored further via cross-sectional regressions of annual market share 
of Virginia counties and independent cities. The basis for this cross-sectional meth-
odology is described in Diamond (2008), where it is used to test for the significance 
of incentives using state aggregate market share. The significance of the presence of 
or close proximity to an HOV lane was tested, along with several other demographic 
variables for each county or city, using the following model specification:
 
This specification is extremely basic due to the limited amount of control data 
available at the local level. The percentage of votes for Green Party presidential 
candidate Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election was chosen as a proxy 
for environmentalism in the absence of a more direct local proxy such as the 
Green Planning Capacity Index used by Diamond (2008) or per-capita Sierra Club 
memberships used by Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008). However, the choice of 
Green Party votes is consistent with Kahn (2007), who uses Green Party registra-
tion percentages as a proxy for environmentalism. Because Virginia does not track 
individual party membership, actual election results were used instead.5 
Mean commute time served as a proxy for relative commute distance, under the 
assumption that a further commute would provide a greater incentive to pur-49
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chase a more fuel-efficient vehicle. Actual survey data on commute distance was 
not available at the county and city level for Virginia. While commute time proved 
significant in the regression, congestion may artificially inflate commute time for a 
given distance in urban areas. 
Average gas prices proved significant at predicting hybrid market share at the state 
levels in previous studies (Diamond 2008; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2008), but it 
was difficult to incorporate gas prices into the Virginia analysis. Detailed historical 
average gas prices at the Virginia county and city levels were not readily available, 
although several services, such as Gasbuddy.com and VAgasprices.com, provide 
daily price data from a selection of gas stations within each locality. A county-level 
plot of daily gasoline prices from Gasbuddy.com on June 6, 2007, showed that 
average county gas prices varied between $2.82 and $3.11, with a standard devia-
tion of only 4.5 cents per gallon (Gasbuddy 2007). However, variations between 
individual stations in the same county were almost as much as variations between 
county averages. In one attempt to use the June 6 county gas prices as a control, 
prices were statistically significant in some years, but with a negligible (and, in 
some cases, negative) effect.6
Table 1 provides a description of the variables and data sources. 
Table 1. Description of Variables for Virginia Hybrid Analysis
 Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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Table 2 provides a summary of the data used for each variable.
Table 2. Summary of Variables for Virginia Hybrid Analysis
In FY07, the HOV dummy variable for Northern Virginia was adjusted to remove 
counties containing or adjacent to the I-95/395 HOV lanes, where new hybrids 
were no longer entitled to single-occupant HOV lane access. Table 3 lists the coun-
ties represented by the HOV dummy variables.
 
Table 3. Virginia HOV Counties and Cities7
The regression was performed using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification. 
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity in STATA indicated 
significant heteroskedasticity problems for jurisdictions with higher marketshare. 51
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The presence of multiple zero values in the dependent market share variables 
(indicating jurisdictions that had no hybrids titled for that fiscal year) precluded 
the use of a log or Box-Cox transformation to reduce the effect. Instead, the results 
include heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors generated in STATA for the OLS 
regression. Table 4 lists regression results for each fiscal year. 
Median household income, Green Party voting percentage, and mean commute 
time were statistically significant in explaining hybrid market share for all years 
except FY01. Of these three variables, Green Party voting percentage and house-
hold income had the strongest effects, with Beta coefficients increasing steadily 
each year from FY02 through FY06. In FY06, one standard deviation changes in 
Green Party voting percentage and household income were associated with .40 
and .33 standard deviation changes, respectively, in new hybrid market share. In 
Northern Virginia, the HOV lane incentive was significant at the p < .001 level from 
FY02 to FY06, with Beta values between .3 and .5 for each year. After the incen-
tive ended on I-95/395 in FY07, the presence of the HOV lane incentive on I-66 
and VA-267 remains significant, although the Beta value dropped substantially, to 
.17. In Hampton Roads, there was no statistically significant relationship between 
HOV lane incentives and new hybrid registration for any year, which is consistent 
with the results of the geographic plot analysis in the previous section.
The strength and significance of Green Party voting percentage as a predictor of 
market share from FY05 onward also suggests that any “hybrid backlash” that may 
have occurred in Northern Virginia was not strong enough to erase the positive 
environmental image of the hybrid statewide. To further examine whether this 
theorized backlash actually occurred in Northern Virginia, regressions of market 
share versus income, commute time, and Green Party voting percentage were 
performed only for the 17 counties in Northern Virginia that were impacted by 
the HOV lane incentive (where the original HOV_NV dummy variable was equal 
to 1). Green Party voting percentage was insignificant until FY04, when it bordered 
on significance with Beta values greater than .5. In FY07, after the elimination of 
the incentive for new hybrids on I-95/395, it became significant with a Beta value 
of .71. Thus, the trends in significance and strength of effect for the environmen-
talism proxy in Northern Virginia from FY04-FY07 are fairly consistent with the 
trends statewide from the original regression. A detailed results table for Northern 
Virginia is omitted. Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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Conclusions 
The geographic and regression analyses of hybrid registration patterns in North-
ern Virginia and Hampton Roads suggests that HOV lane incentive policies can 
significantly impact the adoption of hybrids by consumers, but only under specific 
circumstances. The geographic analysis shows that hybrid market share was high-
est along the I-95/395 corridor—where HOV lanes offer the greatest time savings 
for commuters—but less dramatic on I-66 and VA-267. Likewise, the Beta value 
for the Northern Virginia HOV dummy in the regression dropped sharply after the 
I-95/395 corridor was excluded in FY07. 
Surprisingly, the HOV incentive appears to have had no significant impact on 
hybrid vehicle market share in the Hampton Roads area. This may be due to a 
number of factors, but is most likely due to the nature of the local highway and 
HOV lane systems. While HOV lanes provide some degree of time savings in the 
Hampton Roads area, the overall traffic congestion and time saved are much less 
than on Northern Virginia highways. A 2002 study on attitudes about HOV lanes 
in the Hampton Roads area indicated that only 59 percent of Peninsula (Newport 
News and Hampton) and 76 percent of Southside (Norfolk and Virginia Beach) 
commuters felt that HOV lanes allowed commuters to reach their destinations 
faster than non-HOV lanes, compared to an almost universal appreciation of 
potential HOV time savings among Northern Virginia commuters (The Market-
ing Source 2002). Average distance traveled in the Hampton Roads HOV lanes 
was only 15 miles, compared to 25 mile HOV commutes in Northern Virginia, 
and much of the traffic congestion in Hampton Roads is actually the result of 
several narrow bridges and tunnels (none of which have HOV lanes) that connect 
neighboring counties. Additionally, the mean commute time for Hampton Roads 
HOV counties is significantly less than for Northern Virginia HOV counties—24.8 
minutes versus 33.3 minutes—providing less of an incentive for adopting any time 
savings measure in the first place (U.S.Census Bureau 2000).
The significance of control variables for income, Green Party votes, and commute 
time is consistent with the theory and previous findings that individuals who have 
higher incomes and longer commutes and are more environmentally conscious 
are more likely to become early adopters of new vehicle efficiency technologies, 
ceteris paribus. In the case of HOV lane incentives, the effect of income may be 
amplified because the value of the time savings from HOV access is proportional 
to the value or utility that individuals place on their time. Therefore, individuals 
who earn more per hour might be likely to place a greater value on the incentive. Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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The fact that Green Party voting percentage was the strongest and most signifi-
cant predictor of market share from FY05 onward statewide and still significant in 
Northern Virginia (based on the separate Northern Virginia regressions), particu-
larly in FY07, also suggests that any “hybrid backlash” that may have occurred did 
not erase the positive environmental image of the hybrid. 
Even before FY07, the relative effect of Northern Virginia HOV lane access on 
market share had begun to decrease compared to other factors, perhaps in antici-
pation of the incentive’s eventual expiration. The Beta values for the Northern 
Virginia HOV incentive peaked in FY04 then dropped each of the following years. 
Conversely, the Beta values for the coefficient of the household income variable 
increased from .21 in FY04 to .32 in FY05 and remained steady through FY07, 
while the Beta values for the Green Party voting percentage variable continued to 
increase, reaching a value of .61 by FY07.
The main findings of this research are that 1) Virginia’s HOV lane incentive appears 
to have had a significant impact on hybrid vehicle adoption in Northern Virginia, 
but not in Hampton Roads; 2) the impacts of HOV incentive policies in general 
appear to be very sensitive to local conditions and the potential for time savings 
on a particular HOV corridor; and 3) the presence of the HOV incentive did not 
appear to diminish the impact of other factors—particularly environmental con-
sciousness—on adoption of hybrid vehicles. While this paper looked specifically 
at Virginia, it is reasonable that evaluations of incentive policies in other states 
would highlight similar trade-offs between effectiveness, equity and unintended 
consequences. 
Other states have already incorporated limitations into their own HOV policies. 
California limited the total number of solo HOV access permits to 85,000 to pre-
vent overcrowding, although there is still anecdotal evidence that the policy has 
resulted in HOV lane congestion and sharply inflated prices that dealers charged 
for hybrids as the state neared the limit on permits (McKenzie 2007). Utah offers 
single passenger express lane access to all drivers willing to pay a $500 per year fee, 
but charges hybrid owners only $50 for the fee (U.S. Department of Energy 2007). 
While this may address the equity issue and help prevent any hybrid image back-
lash, it may also dampen the perceived utility of the incentive by explicitly limiting 
its value to $450 per year. Other states have qualified HOV and other incentives 
with minimum gas mileage standards or periodic impact reviews. 
Finally, an important consideration of the HOV exemption policy, compared 
to “one-time” incentives such as rebates or credits, is that it creates a small but 55
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extremely vocal group of “entrenched stakeholders”  —hybrid owners—who have 
a significant personal stake in continuing the policy and are likely to fight strongly 
against any attempt to discontinue it by lawmakers or state agencies. Although 
this concern is common to all incentives that offer a continuing benefit over time, 
HOV access—more so than monetary incentives—may also influences residents’ 
long-term decisions on where they live and work, encouraging choices that cannot 
be easily undone. Thus, the unique nature of the HOV incentive and the debate 
that the policy has caused in Virginia should give pause to other states considering 
similar programs. At the very least, policymakers would be wise to include feed-
back and data collection requirements into incentive legislation to help assess and 
manage the impact of incentive policies. 
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Endnotes
1 I-95 becomes I-395 between the I-495 Beltway and the Washington, DC border.
2 The term “slug line” refers to the anonymous ridesharing lines that form at sev-
eral HOV park-and-ride lots in Northern Virginia. During rush hour, single driv-
ers pick up anonymous passengers, known as “slugs,” to gain access to the HOV 
lanes.
3 The data set excluded vehicles that were purchased in Virginia but removed 
from the state prior to May 2007. This may under-report the market share values 
slightly, but it is assumed that this trend affects all counties equally and does not 
affect the comparisons of market share between counties.
4 The Virginia fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30.
5 The 2000 presidential election was chosen because of the strong Green Party 
showing (2.2% statewide) compared to other years.Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008
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6 The negative gas price effect may be due to zone pricing strategies used by gaso-
line distributors set prices based in a manner that optimizes profits in specific 
geographic regions (Bayles 2001). While specific pricing strategies are held as 
trade secrets, prices are generally based on factors affecting demand such as 
commuting patterns and income. In the outlying Northern Virginia HOV coun-
ties where commuters have the choice of solo commuting, carpooling, or rail 
transport, prices may be kept lower to encourage automobile commuting and 
maintain demand. Since these suburban areas include the counties that benefit 
most from the HOV privileges, the zone pricing system may result in a spurious 
inverse correlation between gas prices and hybrid sales. 
7 Commute time was not provided for Alleghany County.
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